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Abstract
The paper provides a continuous time model of the dynamic behavior of exchange rates and
interest rates when exchange rates are managed within a target zone with the possibility of
realignments. In the case of a realignment the exchange rate jumps to a shadow exchange rate.
The timing of realignments is modellled by a Cox process with an intensity that depends on
the location of the exchange rate in the target zone band as well as the distance to the shadow
exchange rate. We set up an approximate maximum likelihood estimation approach and
provide parameter estimates for six ERM target zones. Moreover, in the empirical analysis
we lter out the shadow exchange rates and investigate which fundamental macroeconomic
factors are able to explain the short run and long run behavior of the ltered shadow exchange
rates.
1 Introduction
The paper investigates the behavior of exchange rates and interest rates within a target zone
by analyzing empirically the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) within the European Mo-
netary System during the period form March 1979 to June 1997. The target zones within
the European Monetary System provide an interesting and unique case for examining issues
concerning how monetary policy aects the behavior of exchange rates, interest rates, and
other important macroeconomic variables. In particular, the exchange rate regime experi-
enced some stable and unstable periods. Thus, at several occasions there were \speculative
attacks" on a number of currencies which eventually lead to the de facto suspension of the
target zone regime in August 1993 where the bands were extended to thirty percent for most
of the currencies involved.
It remains an open question whether the unstable periods of the ERM within the Euro-
pean Monetary System were caused by macroeconomic variables and exchange rates being
fundamentally misaligned or whether the speculative attacks were basically driven by agents
suddenly changing beliefs with respect to the sustainability of a given target zone (see e.g.
Obstfeld, 1996, and Velasco, 1996).
We use a two step procedure in order to analyze how the behavior of the exchange
rates and interest rates within the ERM can be explained by fundamental macroeconomic
factors. In the rst step, we present and estimate a bilateral continuous time model where
the exchange rate jumps to a shadow exchange rate whenever a realignment happens. The
shadow exchange rate can be thought of as the natural, or fundamental, level of the exchange
rate if there was no target zone regime. An important feature of the modelling is that we
can lter out the shadow exchange rate from the continuous time empirical analysis. In the
second step, we investigate whether basic macroeconomic variables can explain the short run
and long run movements of the ltered shadow exchange rates.
The continuous time target zone model shares some basic ideas with the model in Chris-
tensen et al. (1998) in the sense that it allows for realignments described by a Poisson process
with a stochastic intensity; a so-called Cox process. Basically, the exchange rate is restricted
to move within a band and can only leave the band by a realignment jump. The intensity for
a realignment depends on the position of the exchange rate within the band and the distance
to the shadow exchange rate. We will assume \uncovered interest rate parity" in order to
1
lter out the shadow exchange rate.
1;2
The target zone model in this paper mainly diers
from the model in Christensen et al. (1998) by the functional form of the drift and volatility
of the managed exchange rate as well as the realignment intensity.
We set up an estimation approach for the continuous time model and provide parameter
estimates for the dierent European currencies that have been engaged in the ERM since the
start in March 1979. The shadow exchange rate is ltered out using the parameter estimates
obtained by an approximate maximum likelihood procedure. In the approximate maximum
likelihood procedure we substitute the true transition density of the exchange rate, described
by a stochastic dierential equation, with its discrete time counterpart. Moreover, we assume
that the model facilitates a sequential cut, in the sense of Engle et al. (1983), in order to
focus on the estimation of the parameters necessary to lter out the shadow exchange rate
at the various observation dates.
The empirical target zone analysis in this paper is especially analogue to the empirical
analyses in Bekaert & Gray (1998) and Li (1998).
3
In particular, Bekaert & Gray (1998)
and Li (1998) also incorporate stochastic realignment risk but explicitly specify the macroe-
conomic variables which are assumed to determine the realignment probabilities; moreover,
Li (1998) provides a small survey of related literature that she builds on and extends. This
diers from the set up in this paper where the implied shadow exchange rate is intended to
summarize the relevant information about macroeconomic variables in the formal continuous
time target zone model.
After ltering out the shadow exchange rates at the various parameter estimates, we
analyze whether macroeconomic variables can explain the observed path of the dierence
between the shadow exchange rate and the managed exchange rate (the degree of misalign-
ment) during the period surrounding the ERM turbulence in 1992-1993. Conceptually, this
investigation is in the spirit of the approach in Svensson (1993) and a number of papers
extending on his approach, e.g. Lindberg et al. (1993), Chen & Giovannini (1994, 1997), and
Rose & Svensson (1994); however, these authors analyze expected realignments whereas we
1
In the appendix, we demonstrate the consistency of \uncovered interest rate parity" with a specic equi-
librium pricing structure in the economy and describe briey how the model is used for pricing exchange rate
contingent claims.
2
The ltering of the shadow exchange rate diers from the simple linear lter in Flood et al. (1991) and
Flood & Rose (1995) especially due to the formal model of a non-credible target zone used in this paper.
3
Whereas the specic estimation procedure in Bekaert & Gray (1998) also relies on a maximum likelihood
approach, Li (1998) uses a Bayesian approach.
2
look upon the degree of misalignment.
4
Using six macroeconomic variables, we run simple
regression analyses in order to investigate which variables are able to explain the ltered de-
grees of misalignment. In line with the results in Campa & Chang (1998), we nd exchange
reserves to be an important determinant of the degree of misalignment across the involved
ERM exchange rates.
In addition to the regression analysis of the short-run behavior of the degree of misalign-
ment during the 1992-1993 ERM turmoil, we furthermore try to establish some basic results
concerning the long-run determinants of the levels of the ltered shadow exchange rates. To
this end, we rely on the standard monetary approach to exchange rates. Especially, we inves-
tigate whether the shadow exchange rates can on the long run be described by relative (i.e.
the home country versus German) money supplies and relative levels of production by means
of a cointegration analysis. The use of cointegration analysis is natural in this context as it
takes the possibility of non-stationarity in the levels of the series into account. Basically, we
nd a monetary equation to be valid on the long run for all of the involved shadow exchange
rates except the French franc versus German mark.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the continuous time target
zone model. We set up an approximate maximum likelihood estimation approach in Section 3.
In Section 4 we report the parameter estimates of the target zone model and investigate the
macroeconomic determinants of the ltered shadow exchange rates. Section 5 concludes. The
appendix describes the relevant pricing kernel in the economy and how to price exchange rate
contingent claims.
2 The continuous time target zone model
The dynamics are in the following continuous time model described by a two-dimensional
wiener process (W
1t
;W
2t
), with a correlation coeÆcient , and a jump process N
t
which can
be thought of as a Poisson process where the intensity is described by a stochastic process 
t
;
formallyN
t
is a so-called Cox process. The basic idea in the target zone modelling is to restrict
the exchange rate to move within a band unless a realignment occurs. Within the band,
the exchange rate is described by a standard stochastic dierential equation. Furthermore,
realignments occur just as jumps in a Cox process. The intensity for jumps, in particular,
4
The model allows us to lter out the probabilities of devaluations as well, though, we focus here on the
series for the shadow exchange rates.
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depends on the position of the exchange rate within the band as well as how misaligned
the exchange rate is relatively to some \fundamental" which we will refer to as the shadow
exchange rate. The shadow exchange rate can be interpreted as the natural level for the
exchange rate if the target zone regime is suspended.
2.1 The exchange rate dynamics
As described above, the exchange rate is restricted to move within a band in time periods
without realignments. Whenever a realignment happens, the exchange rate jumps to a shadow
exchange rate. The dynamics of the (log-) shadow exchange rate, f
t
, are described by a
stochastic dierential equation on the form,
df
t
= dt+ dW
1t
(1)
where  and  are constant parameters. The parameter  describes the expected change in
the shadow exchange rate whereas  is the volatility of the shadow exchange rate.
We will use the convention that the exchange rate is the price of the foreign currency in
units of the domestic currency. Moreover, for all specic exchange rates in the paper, we
use the convention that the German mark is the foreign currency so that the exchange rate
always refers to the price of the German mark in dierent local currencies.
The dynamics of the logarithm to the exchange rate, x
t
, are described by,
dx
t
= [a(
t
  x
t
) + b
t
(f
t
  x
t
)] dt+ Æ
s
4(u
t
  x
t
)(x
t
  l
t
)
(u
t
  l
t
)
2
dW
2t
+ 
t
dN
t
(2)
where
b
t
 b(x
t
; 
t
; l
t
; u
t
) =
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:


u
t
 x
t
u
t
 
t

if 
t
< x
t
< f
t


x
t
 l
t

t
 l
t

if f
t
< x
t
< 
t
 otherwise
and a, , and Æ are constant parameters. The processes 
t
, l
t
, and u
t
are the (log-) central
parity, the (log-) lower bound of the band, and the (log-) upper bound of the band and,
in general, 
t
=
1
2
l
t
+
1
2
u
t
. The jump component in (2) incorporates the possibility of re-
alignments into the model. In particular, 
t
describes the jump size of the exchange rate in
case of a realignment. We will describe the precise modelling of realignments in the next
section. In this section, we will focus on the basic ideas behind the modelling of exchange
rate movements and the interpretation and signicance of the parameters a, , and Æ when
the exchange rate moves within the target zone.
4
The parameter a describes the degree of tendency towards the central parity rate. Like-
wise, the parameter  describes the degree of tendency towards the shadow exchange rate
through the function b(x
t
; 
t
; l
t
; u
t
); this happens in such a way that the tendency evaporates
at the boundaries whenever the tendency towards the shadow exchange rate would otherwise
pull it outside the exchange rate band. Our specication of the drift rate for the exchange rate
diers from the specication in Christensen et al. (1998) where there is no tendency towards
the shadow exchange rate whenever the exchange rate is close to the boundaries. In our
model, the tendency towards the shadow exchange rate is not zero if, say, the exchange rate
is close to the lower boundary and the shadow exchange rate is above the current exchange
rate. This seems a more appealing characteristic since, in this case, the tendency towards a
shadow exchange rate should tend to pull the exchange rate away from the lower boundary.
The model is formulated in such a way that the volatility of the exchange rate evaporates
at the boundaries. The tendency towards the central parity will thus always pull the exchange
rate into the band whenever it is close to a boundary { and sometimes helped by the tendency
towards the shadow exchange rate, as discussed above. The only way the exchange rate can
leave the band is by a jump. The parameter Æ is a volatility parameter for the exchange rate
within the band and the model is specied such that Æ can be interpreted as the volatility of
the exchange rate when located in the center of the target zone.
[ INSERT FIGURE 1 AND FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ]
The drift and volatility of the managed exchange rate as a function of the exchange rate
within a specic target zone band is illustrated in Figure 1 and Figure 2, respectively. The
drift rate is a stochastic process, since it is a function of the shadow exchange rate f
t
, and
Figure 1 thus only illustrates the form of the drift rate for ve dierent values of the shadow
exchange rate. As illustrated by Figure 2, the volatility of the managed exchange rate is
highest in the center of the target zone but evaporates rapidly close to the boundaries. On
the other hand, the drift rate of the managed exchange rate is always negative (positive) at
the upper (lower) boundary so that the managed exchange rate is pulled towards the center
of the target zone when located at the boundaries; for a given level of the shadow exchange
rate f
t
the drift rate is linear for some segments but non-linear for other segments in order to
obtain this feature at the boundaries. Basically, when the exchange rate is not under pressure
the drift is linear. This is e.g. the case if the shadow exchange rate is at the center of the
target zone as in the case f
t
= 0 in Figure 1.
5
2.2 Realignments
The shadow exchange rate f
t
is dened as the natural level of the exchange rate if a realign-
ment of the band should occur. Realignments usually occur whenever at least one of the
currencies in the ERM is under pressure. The involved currencies will usually not be under
pressure versus German mark, if the exchange rate is close to the lower boundary of the
band. Below, we will start out by describing the timing of realignments and then the model
for what happens at a realignment date.
The arrival of realignments is modelled as jumps in a Cox process. This generalizes the
jump feature of the target zone modelling by Ball & Roma (1993) and Dumas et al. (1995)
where the realignment intensity is assumed constant. We will assume that the jump intensity
for a realignment in any specic currency against the German mark depends on the distance
to the central parity of the target zone as well as the distance to the shadow exchange rate.
Formally, the jump intensity for a realignment is,

t
 (x
t
; 
t
; l
t
; u
t
; f
t
) = 
0
+ 
1
max[0; (f
t
  x
t
)

x
t
  
t
u
t
  l
t

] (3)
where 
0
and 
1
are constant non-negative parameters. This specication captures the basic
characteristics of the probability of a realignment as described above and has some other
desirable implications as we will discuss briey in the following.
If the exchange rate is located above (below) both the central parity and the shadow
exchange rate, the specic exchange rate will not be under pressure. In this case, the tendency
towards the shadow exchange rate will also adjust the exchange rate towards the central parity
and, hence, the divergence from the shadow exchange rate is not a threat to the maintenance
of the target zone. The intensity is, in this case, a non-negative constant, 
0
, and potential
realignments will occur as occasional general adjustments of the central parities within the
ERM or as a consequence of another currency being misaligned under the present parities.
However, if the exchange rate is located in between the central parity and the shadow
exchange rate the specic currency might be under pressure since the tendency towards the
shadow exchange rate will pull the exchange rate further away from the central parity. In this
case, the intensity describing the probability of a realignment is more signicant and given
by 
0
+ 
1
(f
t
  x
t
)(x
t
  
t
)(u
t
  l
t
)
 1
. The realignment intensity depends on the current
distance to the central parity and the distance to the shadow exchange rate. The distance to
the shadow exchange rate, in particular, reects how far the current exchange rate is from
the natural level of the exchange rate if the target zone was suspended and thus describes
6
how misaligned the current exchange rate is.
If a realignment occurs, there will be a discrete change in the lower and upper boundary
for the exchange rate band and usually a discrete change in the central parity as well.
5
Moreover, there will be no actions taken by central banks to prevent the exchange rate from
jumping to its natural level as reected by the shadow exchange rate and, hence, there will
usually also be a discrete jump in the exchange rate at a realignment date.
The lower and upper boundary of the band are stochastic processes that can be modelled
as Cox processes with stochastic intensities and stochastic jump sizes. Likewise, the central
parity will be a process of this type. For all the processes, the arrival of jumps is described by
N
t
. However, we will not make any specic assumptions on the jump sizes for the processes
as this is not crucial for the estimation approach and the ltering of the shadow exchange
rates as described in Section 3.
6
Finally, we will assume that whenever a realignment occurs, the exchange rate will not
necessarily jump exactly to the shadow exchange rate. Rather, the (log- ) exchange rate will
jump to the (log-) shadow exchange rate plus some noise described by serially independent
and normally distributed stochastic variables with mean zero and standard deviation !. The
jump sizes in equation (2) thus have the form: 
t
= (f
t
  x
t
) + 
t
where 
t
 NID(0; !
2
).
2.3 The interest rate spread
We will follow a standard approach in the economic literature and assume \uncovered interest
rate parity" in the sense that the short interest rate spread is equal to the expected change
in the log-exchange rate. \Uncovered interest rate parity" is often rejected in empirical tests
based on oating exchange rates. However, Svensson (1992) argues that the assumption
of \uncovered interest rate parity" is more appropriate for managed exchange rates in a
target zone, and this is to some extent supported by empirical results in e.g. Bossaerts &
Hillion (1991) and Rose & Svensson (1995). In addition, imposing \uncovered interest rate
parity" places some restrictions on the pricing kernel (for example marginal utilities of a
representative agent) in the economy that is relevant for general asset pricing and pricing
of exchange rate contingent claims. In the appendix we demonstrate the existence of a
5
We consider all changes in either 
t
, l
t
, or u
t
as indicators of a realignment. Thus, we consider a change
in the width of the band as a realignment even when the central parity is kept constant.
6
We will assume that the model facilitates a sequential cut in the sense of Engle et al. (1983); the details
are given in Section 3.
7
pricing kernel process which is consistent with \uncovered interest rate parity" in the sense
that the short interest rate spread is equal to the expected change in the log-exchange rate;
moreover, the appendix describes how exchange rate contingent claims can be priced within
the continuous time target zone model.
By the \uncovered interest rate parity", the interest rate spread in the economy must
equal the drift rate in the (log-) exchange rate plus a component representing the expected
(log-) exchange rate movement due to a realignment; see equation (2). Let r
D
t
denote the
domestic interest rate and let r
F
t
denote the foreign interest rate. From (2), we then have:
r
t
 r
D
t
  r
F
t
= a(
t
  x
t
) + b
t
(f
t
  x
t
) + 
t
(f
t
  x
t
): (4)
The rst two terms in the description of the interest rate spread, r
t
, are related to the drift
in the exchange rate if the possibility of a realignment is ignored. The third term is related
to the expected change in the exchange rate due the possibility of a realignment; the term
can be interpreted as a rate of probability for a realignment, 
t
, times the expected jump
size, f
t
  x
t
.
The interest rate spread is an increasing function of the shadow exchange rate. The basic
intuition is that the domestic currency will depreciate for high levels of the shadow exchange
rate and, in equilibrium, rational investors must be compensated by a relatively high domestic
interest rate. Obviously, it is a key feature of the modelling that the depreciation of the
domestic currency, for relatively high levels of the shadow exchange rate, may happen either
continuously or by a realignment jump.
Likewise, whenever the exchange rate is below (above) the central parity, the tendency
towards the central parity will tend to depreciate (appreciate) the domestic currency, and
thus induce a high (low) interest rate spread.
Note that, if there was no tendency towards a shadow exchange rate (and, hence, the
second term and third term on the right hand side of equation (4) were absent), the exchange
rate and the interest rate spread would in fact be perfectly negatively correlated. The negative
correlation is entirely due to the tendency away from the boundaries and towards the central
parity; this is similar to the implications of the Krugman (1991) model but is not in line
with the results from empirical tests as noted in e.g. Bertola & Caballero (1992). In this
perspective, the tendency towards the shadow exchange rate in our model allows for a positive
correlation between the exchange rate and the interest rate during periods with pressure on
the exchange rate.
8
2.4 Filtration of the shadow exchange rate
An important feature of the model is that there is an invertible relationship between the
interest rate spread and the shadow exchange rate given knowledge of all the other state-
variables in the economy (i.e. x
t
, l
t
, u
t
, 
t
).
We will use this observation to lter out the shadow exchange rate at dierent time
points and in the estimation approach in the following section as well. The relationship
between the shadow exchange rate and the interest rate spread in the economy is given by
(4). As discussed above, the interest rate spread is monotonically increasing as a function of
the shadow exchange rate and, hence, we can invert the relationship and write the shadow
exchange rate as a function of the interest rate spread. The interest rate spread is in fact
a linear function of the shadow exchange rate for some values of the state-variables and a
second order polynomial for other values; this can be seen by inserting the denitions of b
t
and 
t
in equation (4). By inverting the relationship, the solution for the shadow exchange
rate has the following form:
f
t
=
8
>
<
>
:
x
t
+
r
t
+C
t
+
0
if (r
t
+ C
t
)(x
t
  
t
)  0
x
t
+
 B
t
+
p
B
2
t
+4A
t
(r
t
+C
t
)
2A
t
otherwise
(5)
where
A
t
= 
1

x
t
 
t
u
t
 l
t

B
t
=
8
<
:


u
t
 x
t
u
t
 
t

+ 
0
if r
t
+ C
t
> 0; x
t
> 
t


x
t
 l
t

t
 l
t

+ 
0
otherwise
C
t
= a(x
t
  
t
):
In the estimation approach below, we will think of and refer to f
t
as an observable variable,
similar to the other state-variables involved, though the observability is always understood
to be transmitted through (5). Likewise, equation (5) describes how the shadow exchange
rate for the subsequent macroeconomic analysis is ltered out.
3 Target zone model estimation approach
In this section we describe an approximative maximum likelihood estimation method for the
continuous time target zone model in section 2.
The data are observed at discrete equidistant time points, t
i
, i = 0; :::; I and  = t
i
 t
i 1
.
Whenever convenient, we use the simplifying notation: x
i
 x
t
i
, 
i
 
t
i
and so on. At
9
the i'th observation date, we observe the exchange rate, the interest rate spread, and the
lower and upper boundary of the exchange rate band as well as the central parity. Given
a set of parameters, there is an invertible relationship between the interest rate spread and
the shadow exchange rate, as solved for in (5). We will therefore occasionally refer to the
observed shadow exchange rate rather than the observed interest rate spread, though it is
implicitly understood that this observability is transmitted through equation (5). The state-
vector S
i
= (x
i
; f
i
; 
i
; l
i
; u
i
) thus describes the observed state of the economy at the i'th time
point.
The target zone model in Section 2 is Markovian. Hence, if the conditional densities for
the state-vector are analytically known, the log-likelihood function can be formulated and
used as a basis for ndingmaximum likelihood parameter estimates. The conditional densities
implied by the continuous time target zone model are, however, not known and maximum
likelihood estimation is therefore not directly accessible. The approach taken below is based
on approximative maximum likelihood estimation in the sense that the conditional densities
are proxied by their counterparts from a discretized version of the stochastic dierential
system in (1) and (2). The discretized version is based on Euler discretization schemes and
has the form,
f
i+1
= f
i
+ +  ~z
1;i
(6)
x
i+1
=
8
>
<
>
:
x
i
+ [a(
i
  x
i
) + b
i
(f
i
  x
i
)] + Æ
r
4(u
i
 x
i
)(x
i
 l
i
)
(u
i
 l
i
)
2
~z
2;i
ifJ
i+1
= 0
f
i+1
+ 
i+1
ifJ
i+1
= 1
(7)
where (~z
1;i
; ~z
2;i
) are serially uncorrelated and bivariate normally distributed variables,
(~z
1;i
; ~z
2;i
)  NID(0;);  =
 
1 
 1
!
and J
i+1
is an indicator function for a realignment; J
i+1
 1
fl
i+1
6=l
i
g[fu
i+1
6=u
i
g
. Hence, J
i+1
takes on the value one if there is a realignment and zero otherwise. If there is a realignment,
the exchange rate jumps to the shadow exchange rate plus some noise and this happens in
the end of the period; J
i+1
= 1 thus indicates a realignment immediately before time t
i+1
.
We will use the following approximation of the probability of no realignment occurring in
the interval from t
i
to t
i+1
:
E
t

e
 
R
t
i+1
t
i

u
du

 e
 
i

(8)
The left hand side of (8) is an exact characterization of the probability of no realignment;
see for example Lando (1994). An analytical solution to the expectations is not known. The
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suggested approximation is obtained by replacing the integral involved on the left hand side
of (8) with its left point approximation.
We can solve analytically for the conditional densities implied by the discretized system
described by (6), (7), and (8) and this will be used in the nal formulation of the log-likelihood
problem below.
Similar to the continuous time model, the discretized version is Markovian. The likelihood
function is a function of the model parameters (as well as the empirical observations) and
is described by the joint density of the observations. The parameters of the model can be
summarized as  = 
1
[
2
where, in particular, 
1
is the set of parameters involved in the
formal modelling of the exchange rate dynamics in (1), (2), and (3) while 
2
are parameters
describing jump sizes of 
t
, l
t
, and u
t
. The joint density function for the state-variables
conditional on the initial state S
0
can be written on the following form,
p(S
1
; : : : ; S
I
jS
0
; ) =
I
Y
i=1
p(S
i
jS
i 1
; ) (9)
=
I
Y
i=1
p(x
i
; f
i
; J
i
jS
i 1
; )p(
i
; l
i
; u
i
jx
i
; f
i
; J
i
; S
i 1
; ) (10)
=
I
Y
i=1
p(x
i
; f
i
; J
i
jS
i 1
; 
1
)p(
i
; l
i
; u
i
jx
i
; f
i
; J
i
; S
i 1
; ) (11)
where p(  j  ; ) is used as notation for the conditional densities of the discretized model.
In the rst equality in (9), we have used the Markovian properties of the model while the
second equality is based on an application of Bayes Rule. The last equality follows from
the observation that p(x
i
; f
i
; J
i
jS
i 1
; ) = p(x
i
; f
i
; J
i
jS
i 1
; 
1
); which essentially just states
the fact that the conditional densities for the exchange rate, the shadow exchange rate, and
whether a jump occurs or not are functions of the parameters in (6) and (7) as well as the
jump probabilities in (3) and (8) only.
We will assume that the density function facilitates a sequential cut; see Engle et al. (1983).
Stated formally, we assume that p(
i
; l
i
; u
i
jx
i
; f
i
; J
i
; S
i 1
; ) = p(
i
; l
i
; u
i
jx
i
; f
i
; J
i
; S
i 1
; 
2
).
The basic intuition behind this assumption is that the location of the band immediately after
a realignment depends only on the exchange rate and the shadow exchange rate but not on
the parameters describing their dynamics in (6) and (7).
7
For the problem of maximizing the
7
Since the realignment occurs immediately before the observation of the new central parity and the new
band width, this assumption is consistent with e.g. the modelling in Christensen et al. (1998) where both the
exchange rate and central parity jump to the shadow exchange rate and the band width is held constant.
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likelihood function determined by (11) with respect to the parameters in 
1
, this assumption
implies that we can ignore the conditional densities p(
i
; l
i
; u
i
jx
i
; f
i
; J
i
; S
i 1
; ) in (11) since
they do not depend on 
1
.
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Specically, the likelihood function for the estimation of the
parameters in 
1
is thus obtained by adopting the description of the density function in (11)
and ignoring these conditional density terms. The remaining part of (11) depends entirely
on the conditional densities implied by the discretized system in (6) and (7) as well as the
jump probabilities in (3) and (8).
As noted above, the relevant likelihood function is a function of the parameters in 
1
as
well as the empirical observations. The expression in (11) describes the likelihood of the im-
plied state-vectors S
i
= (x
i
; f
i
; 
i
; l
i
; u
i
) while the empirical observations are (x
i
; r
i
; 
i
; l
i
; u
i
).
In order to obtain the likelihood in terms of the empirical observations we will apply the
change-of-variable formula which involves the Jacobian determinant of the transformation
between the empirical observations and the state-vector S
i
. In our case, the Jacobian deter-
minant reduces to the partial derivative of the implied shadow exchange rate f
i
(as described
in (5)) with respect to the interest rate spread r
i
. Using the change-of-variable formula, the
relevant log-likelihood function for estimation can be written on the following form,
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Moreover, (x
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) is weakly exogenous for inference about 
2
; see Engle et al. (1983), Denition 2.5.
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The parameter estimates of the target zone model reported in the following section are
obtained by maximizing the log-likelihood function (13) with respect to 
1
.
4 Empirical results
In this section we will describe the data and estimation results. Furthermore, we will discuss
the parameter estimates and present ltered shadow exchange rates. Finally, we will analyze
issues concerning macroeconomic determinants of misalignment on the short run and long
run.
4.1 Data
The data consists of weekly observations on exchange rates and 1-month Euro market interest
rates. Data was collected for the seven countries which have been involved in the ERM since
March 13, 1979. The exchange rate data consists of exchange rates for the six currencies:
Belgian franc (BEF), Danish kroner (DKK), French franc (FRF), Irish pound (IEP), Italian
lira (ITL), and Dutch guilder (NLG) versus the German mark (DEM). The data for the short
interest rates consists of the interest rate spreads between the 1-month Euro market interest
rates in the same six European countries and the 1-month Euro market rate for the German
mark. The Euro market interest rates are bid rates collected at around 10 a.m. Swiss Time;
the interest rate data was supplied by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
The data series span from March 13, 1979 until June 25, 1997 (November 4, 1981 until
June 25, 1997 for the Irish pound). The data is available on a daily basis, but since there
might be small discrepancies in the exact time of the day for the sampling of the exchange
rate observations and the Euro market interest rate observations, we have chosen to use
weekly data. The data consists of observations on Wednesdays (Thursday if Wednesday is
not available) and we have 955 weekly observation dates for all currencies except the Irish
pound for which we have 817 weekly observation dates.
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4.2 Target zone estimation results
In implementing the approximate maximum likelihood method as described above, we ex-
perienced some identication problems when running the problem unrestricted for the six
individual currencies.
9
As a consequence, we x two parameters to be equal for all the six
currencies in the results reported below.
The two parameters we nd reasonable to x a priori are the parameters ! and 
0
which
are parameters that describe the timing as well as what happens at a realignment date. Since
only a few realignments are observed for each exchange rate (two for the Dutch guilder versus
German mark exchange rate to eleven for the Italian lira versus German mark exchange rate)
it is obviously diÆcult to obtain reliable estimates on these parameters; the parameter 
1
also describes the timing of realignments during periods of speculative pressure on the target
zone and is estimated as part of the general approximate maximum likelihood estimation
problem outlined in Section 3. Our specic reasoning and the concrete choice of parameter
values for ! and 
0
are described in the following.
At a realignment date, the (log-) exchange rate will jump to the (log-) shadow exchange
rate plus some \noise"; the parameter ! describes the standard deviation of this noise term.
In the estimation results reported below, we x this standard deviation at a 0.25 percent
level, i.e. ! = 0:0025, which reects our subjective view of the part of a realignment jump
which can be attributed to \noise".
10
The parameter 
0
describes the intensity of a realignment when the specic currency
is not under pressure versus the German mark; see the discussion of equation (3). When
the currency is not under pressure, the realignment intensity is constant as in a standard
Poisson process. Moreover, a reasonable (maximum likelihood) estimator of the intensity in
a Poisson process is the number of jumps divided by the process time. Hence, this parameter
is calibrated by the ratio of number of jumps to the amount of time spent not under pressure
for the total of the six currencies. The position of the exchange rate within the band is used
as a proxy for whether the currency is under pressure or not. If the exchange rate is below
the central parity, we view the exchange rate as not being under pressure. This is based on
the reasoning that the German mark is usually the \strong" currency within the ERM and,
9
This problem shows up when inverting the Hessian matrix of the log-likelihood problem at the optimal
parameter estimates in order to obtain standard errors.
10
This e.g. implies that if there is a realignment jump and the shadow exchange rate is F
t
 e
f
t
= 1, there
is a 95% probability that the exchange rate will be in the interval [0.9951,1.0049] after the realignment jump.
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therefore, if there is a pressure on a specic currency versus the German mark, it will be at
the upper boundary of the band. The number of realignments when the exchange rate is in
the lower part of the band in the data sample is three (one for DKK, one for ITL, and one
for IEP). The total time spent in the lower part of the band is 44.71 years and the estimate
of the intensity parameter is obtained as 
0
= 3/44.71 = 0.0671.
The estimates obtained by maximizing the log-likelihood function in (13), with restrictions
on ! and 
0
, are presented in Table 1.
11
[ INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ]
We will provide our interpretation of the parameter estimates in the following discussion.
Moreover, the implied shadow exchange rates in the subsequent empirical analysis are ltered
out using the tabulated parameter estimates.
The credibility of the target zone is reected through at least the parameters , a, and 
1
.
The parameter  determines the drift rate of the shadow exchange rate and thus indicates
the sustainability of a given target zone. Specically, if the parameter  is dierent from
zero, it is not likely that a specic target zone band can be sustained over long time periods
since the shadow exchange rate will tend to drift outside the band and will thus inevitably
put the target zone under pressure at some time point. The parameter estimates in Table 1
indicate that the drift rate of the Dutch guilder shadow exchange rate is not signicantly
dierent from zero ( = 0.0010) while the parameter estimates of  for the other currencies
versus German mark are all positive. The highest estimate of  is obtained for the Italian
lira versus German mark ( = 0.0619) which indicates a low sustainability of this particular
target zone; this is not a surprising result having in mind the frequent target zone adjustments
of the Italian lira versus German mark in the estimation period.
High credibility of a target zone is also associated with a high parameter value of a, which
describes the tendency towards the central parity, and a low parameter value of 
1
, which
describes the realignment intensity during periods where the exchange rate is under pressure.
The highest parameter estimate of a and the lowest parameter estimate of 
1
are obtained
for the Dutch guilder (a = 0.1560 and 
1
= 56.29) which again indicate high credibility of
the target zone for the Dutch guilder versus German mark.
12
The lowest estimate of the
11
The band for the Italian lira was suspended in the period from September 17, 1992 until November 25,
1996. In the estimation procedure, we handled this problem by imposing a very wide band in the period; 1000
percent on each side of the exchange rate.
12
The nding that the Dutch guilder versus German mark exchange rate shows the highest degree of mean
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tendency towards the central parity is obtained for the Italian lira (a = 0.0473) and the
existence of a target zone thus has the weakest implications for the mean-reverting behavior
of the Italian lira against German mark exchange rate within the ERM band. Likewise,
the highest estimate of 
1
is obtained for the Italian lira (
1
= 1162.83) which in addition
suggests that this target zone is considered very likely to be adjusted whenever the Italian
lira is close to the boundaries of the band.
As indicated in the above discussion, the parameter estimates in Table 1 indicate two
polar case: a credible Dutch guilder target zone and a non-credible Italian lira target zone.
In this perspective, we will interpret the other parameter estimates.
The parameter  describes the degree of tendency of the exchange rate towards the shadow
exchange rate that takes place continuously and not as a discontinuous realignment jump.
The lowest parameter estimate of  is obtained for the Dutch guilder target zone ( = 0.9299)
while the highest estimate is obtained for the Italian lira target zone ( = 5.3490). A low
estimate of  can, in our view, be interpreted as indicating a well-functioning (credible) target
zone in the sense that the tendency towards the center of the target zone (as described by
the parameter a) tends to dominate the tendency to the shadow exchange rate for low values
of .
The parameter  describes the degree of correlation between the managed exchange rate
and the shadow exchange rate. A low estimate (2. lowest) of  is obtained for the Dutch
guilder target zone ( = 0.2804) while the highest estimate of  is obtained for the Italian lira
target zone ( = 0.9628). In particular, low estimates of  indicate that uctuations in the
shadow exchange rate have relatively low impact on the short run behavior of the managed
exchange rate; this is the case for the Dutch guilder versus German mark. On the other hand,
non-credible target zones, such as the Italian lira target zone, tend to be associated with a
high instantaneous feed-back between the managed exchange rate and the shadow exchange
rate as reected in high estimates of .
The parameter Æ describes the volatility of the exchange rate within the band while the
parameter  describes the volatility of the shadow exchange rate. The lowest estimate of Æ
is obtained for the Dutch guilder target zone (Æ = 0.0113) while the second highest estimate
is obtained for the Italian lira (Æ = 0.0563). The parameter estimates of  exhibit the same
pattern; lowest for the Dutch guilder ( = 0.0240) and highest for the Italian lira ( =
0.0576). If the shadow exchange rate is interpreted as the exchange rate without a target
reversion is consistent with the ndings in Anthony & MacDonald (1998).
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zone being imposed, it makes intuitively sense that a volatile shadow exchange rate also
induces a volatile managed exchange rate within the target zone. Moreover, the estimates
in Table 1 indicate that a low volatility of the managed exchange rate is related to a high
credibility of the target zone.
As noted above, the Dutch guilder target zone and the Italian lira target zone provide
two polar cases. The estimates of the parameters for the Belgium franc target zone are
consistently similar to the estimates of the Dutch guilder target zone but less evident and,
hence, the results indicate a relatively high credibility of the Belgian franc target zone. For
the other target zones the results are mixed and less clear, though, the parameter estimates
are in general in between the two polar cases of the Dutch guilder target zone and the Italian
lira target zone. In the discussion below we will focus on the French franc target zone which
in our view seems to have some special characteristics.
The parameter estimates of the French franc target zone are striking since the results are
somehow mixed in relation to the above discussion of credible versus non-credible target zones.
In particular, the French franc versus German mark exchange rate exhibits high volatility
within the band as reected in the highest estimate of Æ (Æ = 0.0621). This suggests a low
credibility of the French franc target zone. On the other hand, the lowest estimate of the
correlation between the managed exchange rate and the shadow exchange rate is also obtained
for the French franc ( = 0.2431) which, referring to the above discussion, indicates a high
credibility of the French franc target zone. Anyhow, the remaining parameter estimates of
the French franc target zone model are in between the two polar cases of the Dutch guilder
and Italian lira target zones which all and all suggest that the French franc target zone is
less credible than the Dutch guilder target zone but more credible than the Italian lira target
zone.
Finally, note that the French franc target zone has a particular feature that diers from
the other target zones since the French franc shadow exchange rate is seemingly signicantly
less volatile than the managed exchange rate in the center of the target zone band ( =
0.0410 < 0.0621 = Æ). This is somehow surprising since a basic motivation for imposing a
target zone on the exchange rate is to reduce the overall exchange rate uncertainty. The
high estimate of Æ for the French franc target zone may be caused by an inexible functional
form imposed on the volatility term of the managed exchange rate in the particular case of
the French franc target zone (see Figure 2). For example, Bekaert and Gray (1998) present
evidence indicating that the volatility of the managed exchange rate may be higher close to
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the boundaries than in the center of the target zone for the French franc versus German mark
target zone. We will not pursue this issue further in this context.
4.3 Plots of the shadow exchange rates
Although the parameter estimates in Table 1 have interest on their own, an additional impor-
tant purpose with this paper is to provide some ltering estimates regarding the position of
the shadow exchange rates during the estimation period. These are obtained by inserting the
obtained parameter estimates and by inverting the relation between the interest rate spread
and the shadow exchange rate as in equation (5). The ltered shadow exchange rates as well
as exchange rate data, interest rate data, and ERM band data are plotted in Figure 3 to
Figure 8.
[ INSERT FIGURE 3 TO 8 ABOUT HERE ]
At least two features of the plots in Figure 3 to 8 deserve special attention. First, with the
exception of the Dutch guilder shadow exchange rate, all shadow exchange rates are generally
positioned \above" the exchange rate. Second, the plot of the Italian shadow exchange rate
is interesting because the relatively high interest rate spread is not reected in a high degree
of misalignment, as measured by f
t
  x
t
. Hence, the non-credibility of this particular target
zone in some sense implies low stabilizing properties of the target zone and at the same time
the frequent realignments exclude the possibility of large dierences between the shadow
exchange rate and the managed exchange rate.
In addition to these general remarks on the basic properties of the ltered shadow ex-
change rates, we would like to point out that the procedure used in this paper can possibly
add another dimension to the question of whether exchange rates have been misaligned before
periods of currency turmoils and, if so, agents have been able to recognize such misalignments
and trade domestic relative to foreign assets at an increasing interest rate spread. The litera-
ture on this issue is well developed. For instance, Svensson (1993), Rose & Svensson (1994),
and Chen & Giovannini (1997) subtract the expected change of the exchange rate within the
target zone band from the interest rate dierential to study credibility of the target zone
(the so-called drift-adjustment method); Campa & Chang (1998) compute realignment in-
tensities from ERM cross-rate options in order to study the economic determinants of these;
and Bekaert & Gray (1998) study credibility of the French franc target zone by specically
incorporating the possibility of jumps into their empirical model.
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Below we proceed along the lines of an alternative strategy: we lter out f
t
as described
above and then look at whether exchange rates have been increasingly misaligned in the
running up to periods of currency turmoils. Actually, in Figure 9, the degree of misalignment
(dened as f
t
  x
t
) for the ERM currencies are shown. The plots indicate that there have
been a number of occasions where exchange rates were being increasingly misaligned before
realignments { for instance, the paths of f
t
  x
t
preceding a number of realignments in the
early 1980s are increasing for at least some of currencies.
[ INSERT FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE ]
For the currency crises in 1992-1993, on the other hand, only for the Italian lira and the
Irish pound, a clear increase in the spread f
t
 x
t
before the September 1992 respectively the
February 1993 realignment is visible in Figure 9. Perhaps to a lesser extent this is also the
case for the Belgian franc and Danish kroner but is seemingly not the case for the French
franc. This indicates that the nancial markets considered only the Irish pound and the
Italian lira as being fundamentally misaligned during the ERM-turmoils in 1992-1993.
Furthermore, over the whole period, the hypothesis of zero misalignment is clearly rejected
(tests are not shown
13
) and this holds even if the hypothesis of no misalignment is tested over
the period after the Basle-Nyborg agreement in September 1987, after the increase in number
of participants in the ERM in 1990, or after 1992, i.e. the ERM currencies have throughout
the ERM history generally been misaligned in relation to the German mark { and this holds
for all exchange rates. For the Dutch guilder, though, the degree of misalignment seems to
work in the opposite direction in the sense that for NLG, f
t
 x
t
is negative throughout the last
part of the sample. However, supplementing the results on a general misalignment of ERM
exchange rates, it is noted that the degree of misalignment has decreased in recent years which
could point towards increasing convergence between ERM currencies before introducing the
euro on January 1, 1999.
4.4 Determinants of degree of misalignment
In addition to the question of currency crises \predictability" as reected through increased
misalignment, a number of recent articles deals with the extent to which specic macroe-
conomic variables are correlated with measures of speculative pressures and realignment
expectations. In this section, we follow the approach of Eichengreen et al. (1994, 1995, 1996)
13
Specically, we tested whether the mean of the degree of misalignment, f
t
  x
t
, is equal to zero.
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and Campa & Chang (1998) and focus on a specic period of exchange rate turmoil. To this
end, we estimated the models,
(f
t
  x
t
) = cons:+ 
m
m
t
+ 
r
r
L
t
+ 
y
y
t
+ 


t
+ 
R
R
t
+ 
q
q
t
+ 
t
(14)
over the period January 1991 to December 1994
14
, wherem
t
denotes the logarithm of relative
(domestic versus foreign) nominal money (M1), r
L
t
denotes relative interest rates on long
government bonds, y
t
denotes (the logarithm of) relative industrial production, 
t
denotes
(the logarithm of) relative rates of ination, R
t
denotes (the logarithm of) relative levels of
oÆcial reserves excluding gold, q
t
measures the (logarithm of) bilateral real exchange rates
towards Germany, and 
t
is a regression residual. The macroeconomic data was obtained
from the Main Economic Indicators, OECD. As macroeconomic variables are available up
to a monthly frequency only, we obtained series for x
t
and f
t
at the monthly frequency by
averaging over the weekly observations.
[ INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ]
Table 2 shows parameter estimates of (14).
15
A potentially important result from the
table is the signicant estimates of 
R
for Belgium, France, Ireland, and Italy. On average,
a one percentage decrease in relative reserves are associated with a 0.55 percentage increase
in the degree of misalignment. This has potentially important bearings for the literature on
speculative attacks, as the more recent second-generation models (see e.g. Obstfeld, 1996) are
often seen specied in terms of other variables than oÆcial reserves, which play a crucial role
in rst-generation models of speculative attacks (see e.g. Krugman, 1979 or Flood & Garber,
1984). First-generation models versus second-generation models are surveyed and discussed
in e.g. Obstfeld (1994, 1996), Krugman (1996), and Flood & Marion (1997).
A second variable which seems to be of some importance is the relative long interest rates,
which is signicant for Belgium, France, Ireland, and Italy. A one percentage increase in the
spread between a domestic and a foreign long interest rate is associated with an increase in
the degree of misalignment of, on average, 0.50 percentage. This is consistent with Ozkan
14
Campa & Chang (1998) estimate their model over the September 1991 to March 1995 period, whereas
Eichengreen et al. (1994, 1995, 1996) employ exclusion windows of two years before and after a currency crises
in their analyses. In our estimation of (14) we essentially combine these two approaches.
15
As some rst-order autocorrelation was left in the residuals after running the basic OLS regression of (14) ;
we corrected for this feature in the nal regressions.
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& Sutherland (1998) who provide a theoretical model with a positive relation between long
interest rates and probabilities of speculative attacks.
To compare, Rose & Svensson (1994) and Chang & Campa (1998) generally nd explana-
tory power of oÆcial foreign reserves, as do Chen & Giovannini (1997) and Bekaert & Gray
(1998) for France, whereas Rose & Svensson (1994) furthermore nd dierentials between
rates of ination to be signicant over the whole 1979 to 1992 period. In general, though,
the overall conclusion from this analysis (and previous analyses) is that traditional macroe-
conomic variables have a hard time in explaining the short-run turbulence in exchange rates
or realignment expectations during times of currency turmoils as only relatively few variables
are found to be signicant.
4.5 Long-run determinants of the shadow exchange rates
Having pointed towards some characteristics of the degree of misalignment during turbulent
periods of time, it seems natural to investigate whether the lacking explanatory power of
traditional macroeconomic variables is a general characteristic for the shadow exchange rates
which holds also over longer time spans. We investigate this by analyzing the standard
monetary approach to exchange rates. The basic monetary equation for example follows
from assuming a quantity equation in each country, m
i
t
  p
i
t
= y
i
t
, i = D;F , imposing
purchasing power parity (which, for the shadow exchange rates, takes the form f
t
= p
D
t
 p
F
t
)
and reorganizing,
f
t
= m
t
  y
t
(15)
to which a regression constant, v, and a stationary error term can be added.
When interpreting estimates of (15) it is noted that in general we expect (15) to hold only
for oating exchange rates and not necessarily for exchange rates in a target zone. Consider
e.g. the basic Krugman (1991) model of a target zone. A prominent feature of this model
is that the target zone imposes a S-shaped form on the exchange rate within the band, i.e.
monetary disturbances are transmitted only partially to the exchange rate (the \honeymoon
eect"). In this sense, a change in m
t
does not cause an instantaneously one-to-one change
in the exchange rate. In our model, however, f
t
is estimated exactly to give the behavior
of the exchange rate if no target zone is present. Therefore, a reasonable hypothesis is that
the shadow exchange rate behaves like a oating rate and that the relationship in (15) is
appropriate.
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In the analyses of the long-run behavior of the shadow exchange rates, we recognize that
the shadow exchange rates tend to move in a non-stationary fashion (see also Figure 3 to 8)
and for this reason we employ the multivariate cointegration framework of Johansen (1988,
1991, 1995) in order to obtain estimates of the long run attractors for the ltered shadow
exchange rates.
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We thus estimated vector error correction models such as,
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with Y = (f
t
;m
t
; y
t
)
0
;
e
Y
t
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0
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e
Y

t
=

e
Y
0
t
; 1

0
; where d911 and d846 are
dummies and 
0
is the matrix of cointegration vectors, the rank of which, if cointegration
can be established, is less than the dimension of Y
t
, i.e. less than three.
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In testing for cointegration, we followed Johansen (1992) who advocates the use of a
sequential testing strategy; the so-called \Pantula-principle", so as to test for restrictions on
the constant. We ended up restricting the constant to enter the cointegration space only, as
in (16).
[ INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE ]
The tests for the number of cointegration vectors are given in Table 3 for the models where
the constant is restricted to the cointegration space.
18
The results point toward rejection of
both the hypotheses of at most zero and at most one cointegration vector, i.e. we decided on
two cointegration vectors in all models. Our next step was to look for a monetary equation
as a long-run attractor for the shadow exchange rates. We therefore tested whether f
t
 
16
In addition, the continuous time target zone model superimposes non-stationarity of f
t
; see equations (1)
and (6).
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In July 1990, former East and West Germany joined GEMU (German Economic and Monetary Union)
having the German mark replacing the (East) German currency as legal tender. Obviously, this caused a
signicant positive jump in German money supply inuencing all m
t
= m
D
t
 m
F
t
series negatively. In order
to take this jump into account, we follow Juselius (1996) and include a dummy (d911; taking on the value 0
for periods between 1979:3 and 1990:12 and the value 1 in periods between 1991:1 and 1997:6) as a weakly
exogenous variable. Furthermore, the German production series takes a massive dip in 1984:6 which inuences
all y
t
series and to take this into account we included a dummy (d846) taking on the value 1 in period 1984:6
and zero otherwise.
18
We included twelve lags in our nal regression which seems as a reasonable number given the sample
frequency of monthly observations. Reassuring though, the basic results were not altered when running the
cointegration models with other choices for the lag length.
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(m
t
  y
t
+ d911 + v) can be accepted as a stationary series. The results and the estimated
cointegration vectors are given in Table 4.
[ INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE ]
It appears that for ve out of the six currencies under investigation, the hypothesis that
the monetary equation acts as a long-run attractor for the ltered shadow exchange rates
cannot be rejected at standard signicance levels. Only for the French franc the hypothesis
is rejected. Hence, the results support the basic monetary equation in the sense that we
cannot reject an unit elasticity of the shadow exchange rates with respect to the relative
money supplies and the relative production series, respectively. Furthermore, the estimated
coeÆcient of the dummy d911 associated with the German unication is positive. The positive
jump in m
F
t
, and thus the negative jump in m
t
, dictates a negative jump in the shadow
exchange rates if described by the monetary equation in (15); however, these negative jumps
are to some extent adjusted for by the dummy d911.
In general, the results in Table 4 indicate that the shadow exchange rates, on the long
run, do behave in accordance with a standard theory of exchange rate determination. This
is consistent with the ndings of e.g. McDonald & Taylor (1993, 1994), Mark (1995), Chinn
& Meese (1995), and Mark & Choi (1997) in the context of oating exchange rates.
5 Conclusions
We have investigated the dynamics of exchange rates and interest rate spreads in a target
zone using a two step procedure. In the rst step we presented a continuous time target zone
model where the exchange rate was restricted to move within a band but was allowed to leave
the band by a jump. We estimated the model for six ERM exchange rates and extracted the
relevant shadow exchange rates. In the second step, we regressed the degree of misalignment
(the dierence between the ltered shadow exchange rate and the managed exchange rate) on
six macroeconomic variables. Basically, the results indicated some support of rst-generation
models in the sense that exchange reserves were correlated with the degree of misalignment
during the 1992-1993 ERM turmoil for the involved exchange rates. Likewise, a cointegration
analysis provided some evidence for the monetary equation as a long run attractor for ve
(out of six) shadow exchange rates.
In line with most of the literature on target zones, the analysis in this paper has been
restricted to bilateral exchange rates. This is admittedly a simplication since the ERM is a
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multi-lateral target zone (a grid of bands on bilateral currencies) with a number of bilateral
exchange rates being targeted simultaneously. This has, for instance, the implication that a
currency which is actually within the bilateral band towards another currency can be aected
by the intervention against a third currency; see e.g. the analyses in Jrgensen & Mikkelsen
(1996) or Flandreau (1998). The continuous time framework in this paper can potentially be
extended to incorporate such features; of course, at the costs of higher complexity.
Moreover, when estimating the parameters of the target zone model, one could poten-
tially extend the analysis by incorporating data on cross-rate options, as in e.g. Campa &
Chang (1996, 1998). This would be interesting in models that extends the framework of the
present paper, but would require some additional numerical work as no close-form option
pricing formulas exist.
Finally, we believe that the specic modelling in this paper can be extended in dierent
directions. For example, one may allow for a more general specication of the dynamics of
the shadow exchange rate. Likewise, the dynamics of the managed exchange rate may be
generalized to allow for stochastic volatility within the band; i.e. the parameter Æ in (2) may
be replaced by a stochastic process.
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Appendix
In this appendix we will demonstrate the existence of a pricing kernel process that makes
the model in Section 2 consistent with \uncovered interest rate parity" in the sense that the
interest rate spread equals the expected change of the log-exchange rate. In fact, below we
will demonstrate that the following pricing kernel process provides such consistency,
dK
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where the relative jump size (J
t
  1) is stochastic and (

J
t
  1) denotes the expected relative
jump size. Moreover, Æ
t
is used as notation for the whole diusion coeÆcient in the diusion
term for the log-exchange rate in (2) (see also (20) below). The relative jump size can be
chosen on the form,
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By denition of a pricing kernel process, we can price any nancial asset by evaluating
the relevant expectations. Consider a claim having stochastic payo in units of the domestic
currency, S
T
, at some future date T > t. Then the present value of this claim (in units of
the domestic currency) must satisfy,
S
t
= E
t

K
T
K
t
S
T

(19)
In a representative agent equilibrium set-up, the pricing kernel is identical to the marginal
utility of the representative agent and prices are found by marginal utility weighted payos;
see e.g. Lucas (1978) for the discrete time case and Cox et al. (1985a) for the continuous
time case. In general, the mere absence of arbitrage ensures the existence of a pricing kernel
process such that all asset prices satisfy (19); see e.g. DuÆe (1996).
The above assumptions on the form of the pricing kernel process are conceptually dierent
from those in Christensen et al. (1997). Compared to the pricing kernel process in (17), they
basically consider a kernel process where the diusion term and the jump size are zero. This
implies that the interest rate spread equals the rate of change in the exchange rate, X
t
.
19
19
However, due to Siegel's paradox, it is well-known that the interest rate spread will not equal the rate
of change for (1=X
t
), i.e. the exchange rate quoted inversely. In our case, specifying the model in logarithms
ensures that the \uncovered interest rate parity" is valid regardless of how the exchange rate is quoted.
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A.1 Pricing contingent claims by simulations
Using the result in (19), it is straightforward to price any exchange rate contingent claim by
simulations. The model, however, only provides suÆcient structure to determine the interest
rate spread, not the level of interest rates. Hence, it is necessary to provide a model for the
level of interest rates. One approach is to assume that the foreign interest rate is a positive
constant or follows a square root process; as in Cox et al. (1985b). As these interest rate
models ensure positive interest rates and since the interest rate spread versus German mark
is usually positive, this reduces problems concerning the possibility of negative interest rates
within the model.
If we x the foreign interest rate, a simulation approach for evaluating prices on ex-
change rate contingent claims, using the expectations in (19), can have the following form. A
number of paths of the exchange rate process and pricing kernel process is generated (using
discretizations of the stochastic dierential equations involved). At every time point, the do-
mestic interest rate occurring in (17) is found by using the \uncovered interest rate parity".
The price is then obtained as the average of the simulated values of the kernel weighted pay-
os. This simulation method provides a natural procedure for evaluating prices on contingent
claims that cannot be exercised before maturity. Even with the possibility of early exercise,
a simulation approach based on the expectations in (19) can be designed to evaluate, say,
American currency option prices; see e.g. Barraquand & Martineau (1995).
A.2 Consistency of \uncovered interest rate parity"
In the following we will demonstrate that the target zone model in Section 2 and the pricing
kernel process in (17) are consistent with the assumption of \uncovered interest rate parity".
The dynamics of the log-exchange rate, x
t
, can be summarized by,
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where we have introducedm
t
and Æ
t
as notation for the drift term and diusion term, respec-
tively. The precise denitions of m
t
and Æ
t
follow from (2). By an application of Ito's lemma
for jump-diusion processes, the dynamics of the exchange rate, X
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We will assume that there exist a domestic and foreign bank account which provide a risk
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free rate of return equal to the domestic and foreign short interest rates. The accumulated
returns on the bank accounts are described by B
i
t
= e
R
t
0
r
i
u
du
, i = D;F .
In the following, we will refer to a domestic investor as an investor who is concerned
about the return on investments in units of the domestic currency. From the perspective of
a domestic investor, an investment in the domestic bank account accumulates according to,
dB
D
t
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dt (22)
whereas an investment in the foreign bank account is exposed to exchange rate risk and
accumulates according to (again using Ito's lemma for jump-diusion processes):
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The kernel weighted return on the foreign bank account investment can, likewise, be described
by an application of Ito's lemma for jump-diusion processes,
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where the relative jump size (J
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The expected change in the kernel weighted foreign bank account investment is given by,
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where the second equality is obtained by inserting the expected relative jump sizes in (18)
and (25). From the equilibrium asset pricing relation in (19), it is seen that the kernel
weighted foreign bank account investment must be a martingale and, hence, the expected
rate of change must equal zero. Setting the expected rate of change in (27) equal to zero, as
an equilibrium implication, one obtains,
r
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t
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t
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t
  x
t
) (28)
which is the \uncovered interest rate parity".
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Following the above steps, it can be veried that the pricing kernel, K
t
, ensures that a
kernel weighted investment in the domestic bank account is likewise a martingale. This ends
the demonstration of the consistency of the \uncovered interest rate parity" and a specic
pricing kernel process in the economy.
28
References
Anthony, Myrvin & Ronald MacDonald (1998). \On the mean-reverting properties of target
zone exchange rates: Some evidence from the ERM". European Economic Review, 42(8),
1493{1523.
Ball, Cliord A. & Antonio Roma (1993). \A jump diusion model for the European Mone-
tary System". Journal of International Money and Finance, 12(5), 475{492.
Barraquand, Jerome & Didier Martineau (1995). \Numerical Valuation of High Dimen-
sional Multivariate American Securities". Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analy-
sis, 30(3), 383{405.
Bekaert, Geert & Stephen F. Gray (1998). \Target Zones and Exchange Rates: An Empirical
Investigation". Journal of International Economics, 45(1), 1{35.
Bertola, Giuseppe & Ricardo J. Cabellero (1992). \Target Zones and Realignments". The
American Economic Review, 82(3), 520{536.
Bossaerts, Peter & Pierre Hillion (1991). \Market Microstructure Eects of Government
Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market". Review of Financial Studies, 4(3), 513{
541.
Campa, Jose Manuel & Kevin Chang (1996). \Arbitrage-based Tests of Target-zone Cred-
ibility: Evidence from ERM Cross-rate Options". American Economic Review, 86(4),
726{740.
Campa, Jose Manuel & Kevin Chang (1998). \ERM Realignment Risk and its Economic
Determinants as Reected in Cross-rate Options". Economic Journal, 108, 1046{1066.
Chen, Zhaohui & Alberto Giovannini (1994). \The Credibility of Adjustable Parities: The
Experience of the European Monetary System". In Peter B. Kenen; Francesco Papadia,
& Fabrizion Saccomanni, editors, The International Monetary System, chapter 7, pp.
170{200. Cambridge University Press.
Chen, Zhaohui & Alberto Giovannini (1997). \The Determinants of Realignment Expecta-
tions under the EMS: Some Empirical Regularities". European Economic Review, 41(9),
1687{1707.
29
Chinn, Menzie D. & Richard A. Meese (1995). \Banking on Currency Forecasts: How
Predictable is the Change in Money?". Journal of International Economics, 38(1/2),
161{178.
Christensen, Peter O.; David Lando & Kristian Miltersen (1998). \State-Dependent Re-
alignments in Target Zone Currency Regimes". Review of Derivatives Research, 1(4),
295{323.
Cox, John C.; Jonathan E. Ingersoll & Steven A. Ross (1985a). \An Intertemporal General
Equilibrium Model of Asset Prices". Econometrica, 53(2), 363{384.
Cox, John C.; Jonathan E. Ingersoll & Steven A. Ross (1985b). \A Theory of the Term
Structure of Interest Rates". Econometrica, 53(2), 385{407.
DuÆe, Darrell (1996). Dynamic Asset Pricing Theory. Princeton University Press, Princeton,
New Jersey, 2 edition.
Dumas, Bernard; Lars P. Jennergren & Bertil Naslund (1995). \Realignment Risk and Cur-
rency Option Pricing in Target Zones". European Economic Review, 39, 1523{1544.
Eichengreen, Barry; Andrew K. Rose & Charles Wyplosz (1994). \Speculative Attacks on
Pegged Exchange Rates: An empirical exploration with special reference to the European
Monetary System". CEPR Discussion Paper, 1060.
Eichengreen, Barry; Andrew K. Rose & Charles Wyplosz (1995). \Exchange Market May-
heim: The antecedents and aftermath of speculative attacks". Economic Policy, 21,
251{296.
Eichengreen, Barry; Andrew K. Rose & Charles Wyplosz (1996). \Contagious Currency
Crises: Firsts Tests". Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 98(4), 463{484.
Engle, Robert F.; David F. Hendry & Jean-Francois Richard (1983). \Exogeneity". Econo-
metrica, 51, 277{304.
Flandreau, Marc (1998). \The burden of intervention: externalities in multilateral exchange
rates arrangements". Journal of International Economics, 45(1), 137{171.
Flood, Robert P. & Peter M. Garber (1984). \Collapsing Exchange Rate Regimes: Some
Linear Examples". Journal of International Economics, 17(1/2), 1{14.
30
Flood, Robert P. & Nancy P. Marion (1997). \Perspectives on the Recent Currency Crisis
Literature". Working paper, Dartmouth College.
Flood, Robert P. & Andrew K. Rose (1995). \Fixing Exchange Rates: A Virtual Quest for
Fundamentals". Journal of Monetary Economics, 36(1), 3{37.
Flood, Robert P.; Andrew K. Rose & Donald J. Mathieson (1991). \An Empirical Explo-
ration of Exchange-Rate Target-Zones". Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public
Policy, 35, 7{77.
Johansen, Sren (1988). \The Statistical Analysis of Cointegration Vectors". Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control, 12(2), 231{254.
Johansen, Sren (1991). \Estimation and Hypothesis Testing of Cointegration Vectors in
Gaussian Vector Autoregressive Models". Econometrica, 59(6), 1551{1580.
Johansen, Sren (1992). \Determination of the Cointegration Rank in the Presence of a
Linear Trend". Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 54(2), 383{397.
Johansen, Sren (1995). Likelihood Based Inference in Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive
Models. Advanced Texts in Econometrics. Oxford University Press.
Johansen, Sren & Katarina Juselius (1990). \Maximum Likelihood Estimation and Inference
on Cointegration - With Applications to the Demand for Money". Oxford Bulletin of
Economics and Statistics, 52(2), 169{210.
Johansen, Sren & Katarina Juselius (1992). \Testing Structural Hypotheses in a Multivari-
ate Cointegration Analysis of the PPP and the UIP for UK". Journal of Econometrics,
53(1-3), 211{244.
Jrgensen, Bjrn N. & Hans O. . Mikkelsen (1996). \An Arbitrage Free Trilateral Target
Zone Model". Journal of International Money and Finance, 15(1), 117{134.
Juselius, Katarina (1996). \An Empirical Analysis of the Changing Role of the German
Bundesbank after 1983". Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 58(4), 791{819.
Krugman, Paul R. (1979). \A Model of Balance of Payments Crises". Journal of Money,
Credit, and Banking, 11(3), 311{325.
31
Krugman, Paul R. (1991). \Target Zones and Exchange Rate Dynamics". The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 106, 669{682.
Krugman, Paul R. (1996). \Are Currency Crises Self-Fullling?". In Ben S. Bernanke & Julio
J. Rotemberg, editors, NBER Macroeconomics Annual, pp. 345{407. The MIT Press.
Lando, David (1994). \On Cox Processes and Credit Risky Bonds". Working paper, Univer-
sity of Copenhagen, Institute of Mathematical Statistics.
Li, Kai (1998). \Exchange Rate Target Zone Models: A Bayesian Evaluation". Working pa-
per, University of British Columbia. Forthcomming in Journal of Applied Econometrics.
Lindberg, Hans; Paul Soderlind & Lars E. O. Svensson (1993). \Devaluation Expectations:
The Swedish krona 1985-1992". The Economic Journal, 1170{1179.
Lucas, Robert E. (1978). \Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy". Econometrica, 46, 1429{
1445.
MacDonald, Ronald & Mark P. Taylor (1993). \The Monetary Approach to the Exchange
Rate: Rational Expectations, Long-run Equilibrium, and Forecasting". IMF Sta Pa-
pers, 40(1), 89{107.
MacDonald, Ronald & Mark P. Taylor (1994). \The Monetary Model of the Exchange Rate:
Long-run Relationships, Short-run Dynamics and how to beat a RandomWalk". Journal
of International Money and Finance, 13(3), 276{290.
Mark, Nelson C. (1995). \Exchange Rates and Fundamentals: Evidence on Long-Horizon
Predictability". American Economic Review, 85(1), 201{218.
Mark, Nelson C. & Doo-Yull Choi (1997). \Real Exchange-Rate Prediction over Longer
Horizons". Journal of International Economics, 43(1/2), 29{60.
Obstfeld, Maurice (1994). \The Logic of Currency Crises". Banque de France - Cahiers
economiques et monetaires, 43, 189{213.
Obstfeld, Maurice (1996). \Models of Currency Crises with Self-Fullling Features". Euro-
pean Economic Review, 40(3{5), 1037{1047.
32
Osterwald-Lenum, Michael (1992). \A Note with Quantiles of the Asymptotic Distribution
of the Maximum Likelihood Cointegration Rank Statistic: Four Cases". Oxford Bullitin
of Economics and Statistics, 54(3), 461{471.
Ozkan, F. Gulcin & Alan Sutherland (1998). \A Currency Crisis Model with an Optimizing
Policy Maker". Journal of International Economics, 44(2), 339{364.
Rose, Andrew K. & Lars E. O. Svensson (1994). \European Exchange Rate Credibility Before
the Fall". European Economic Review, 38(6), 1185{1216.
Rose, Andrew K. & Lars E. O. Svensson (1995). \Expected and Predicted Realignments:
The FF/DM Exchange Rate during the EMS, 1979{1993". Scandinavian Journal of
Economics, 97(2), 173{200.
Svensson, Lars E. O. (1992). \The Foreign Exchange Risk Premium in a Target Zone with
Devaluation Risk". Journal of International Economics, 33(1), 21{40.
Svensson, Lars E. O. (1993). \Assessing Target Zone Credibility. Mean reversion and de-
valuation expectations in the ERM, 1979-1992". European Economic Review, 37(4),
763{802.
Velasco, Andres (1996). \Fixed Exchange Rates: Credibility, exibility, and multiplicity".
European Economic Review, 40(3{5), 1023{1035.
33
Table 1: Parameter estimates for the continuous time target zone model
Parameter BEF DKK FRF IEP ITL NLG
 0.0220 0.0288 0.0237 0.0500 0.0619 0.0010
(0.0044) (0.0061) (0.0094) (0.0050) (0.0037) (0.0049)
 0.0269 0.0302 0.0410 0.0453 0.0576 0.0240
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0015)
a 0.0910 0.0645 0.0553 0.1551 0.0473 0.1560
(0.0437) (0.0445) (0.0372) (0.0709) (0.0216) (0.0440)
 1.8305 3.2040 1.6279 2.4076 5.3490 0.9299
(0.0607) (0.1326) (0.0623) (0.0876) (0.2013) (0.0730)
Æ 0.0284 0.0305 0.0621 0.0410 0.0563 0.0113
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0003)
 0.7145 0.5158 0.2431 0.9050 0.9628 0.2804
(0.0222) (0.0329) (0.0328) (0.0088) (0.0030) (0.0519)

1
149.90 550.71 310.81 225.35 1162.83 56.29
(10.69) (44.58) (21.24) (16.15) (97.26) (6.25)
Notes: Parameter estimates for the continuous time target zone model for the dierent
currencies against German mark. Standard errors are obtained by inversion of the
Hessian of the log-likelihood function and reported in parentheses below the estimates.
The parameters ! and 
0
are xed a priori at ! = 0.0025 and 
0
= 0.0671.
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Table 2: Macroeconomic determinants of ERM misalignments, 1991{1995
BEF DKK FRF IEP ITL NLG
cons. 0.0056 -0.1119

0.0028 -0.0491

0.0064

-0.0057
(0:0082) (0:0502) (0:0081) (0:0098) (0:0028) (0:0061)

m
-0.0129 -0.0429

0.0186 -0.0096 0.0123 0.0042
(0:0223) (0:0180) (0:0160) (0:0201) (0:0097) (0:0184)

r
L
0.0067

0.0003 0.0102

0.0110

0.0008

0.0010
(0:0025) (0:0004) (0:0026) (0:0019) (0:0003) (0:0028)

y
0.0048 -0.0218 -0.0101 -0.0493

0.0077 -0.0062
(0:0185) (0:0143) (0:0299) (0:0066) (0:0077) (0:0092)


0.0047 -0.0045 0.0052 0.0017 -0.0020 0.0027
(0:0031) (0:0044) (0:0035) (0:0012) (0:0012) (0:0021)

R
-0.0082

0.0050 -0.0098

-0.0117

-0.0035

-0.0043
(0:0034) (0:0036) (0:0030) (0:0027) (0:0010) (0:0025)

q
-0.0017 -0.0016 -0.0036 -0.0018 0.0014

-0.0005
(0:0018) (0:0026) (0:0019) (0:0012) (0:0007) (0:0011)
Diagnostics
R
2
0.72 0.58 0.63 0.89 0.84 0.71
F-test 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14
DW 1.62 1.95 1.63 2.05 1.72 1.79
Notes: The table shows estimates of (14) with corrections for rst-order autocor-
relation obtained by applying the two-step Cochrane-Orcutt procedure. Numbers
in parentheses are standard errors.

respectively

indicate rejection of the hy-
pothesis that the specic coeÆcient equals zero at 99, respectively 95, percentage
condence levels. F-test shows probability value of not rejecting the hypothesis
that all coeÆcients equal zero, DW is the Durbin-Watson test statistic for rst-
order autocorrelation. Number of observations: 48.
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Table 3: Tests for the number of cointegration vectors in the monetary models
rk()  BEF DKK FRF IEP ITL NLG
0 50.83

57.42

58.90

50.56

53.24

60.96

1 22.85

24.05

26.25

25.66

28.66

25.73

2 9.73

7.77 8.05 7.76 12.13

6.19
Notes: Tests for the number of cointegration vectors (Johansen & Juselius,
1990).

respectively

indicate rejection of hypothesis at 99 respectively
95 percentage condence levels. Critical values at various signicance levels
are from Osterwald-Lenum (1992).
Table 4: Tests of the basic monetary equation lying within the stationary space

2
(1) Prob. Estimated cointegration vectors
Belgian franc: 3.34 0.07 f
t
  (m
t
  y
t
+ 0:31  d911 + 3:02)
Danish kroner: 0.06 0.80 f
t
  (m
t
  y
t
+ 0:83  d911 + 0:37)
French franc: 10.07 0.00 f
t
  (m
t
  y
t
+ 0:35  d911 + 1:37)
Irish pound: 0.75 0.39 f
t
  (m
t
  y
t
+ 0:04  d911   1:25)
Italian lira: 1.50 0.22 f
t
  (m
t
  y
t
+ 0:63  d911 + 6:65)
Dutch guilder: 0.44 0.51 f
t
  (m
t
  y
t
+ 0:28  d911 + 0:11)
Notes: Tests for a cointegration vector with a unit coeÆcient on y
t
and a unit coeÆ-
cient (with opposite sign) on m
t
belonging to the cointegration space. The constant
and the coeÆcient on d911 are left unrestricted; the tests have a standard 
2
distri-
bution (Johansen & Juselius, 1992).
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Figure 1: The drift of the managed exchange rate as a function of the current exchange rate
within a target zone with l
t
=  0:0225, u
t
= 0:0225, and  = 0. The relevant parameters are
a = 1 and  = 1.
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Figure 2: The volatility of the managed exchange rate as a function of the current exchange
rate within a target zone with l
t
=  0:0225, u
t
= 0:0225, and  = 0. The volatility parameter
is Æ = 1.
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Figure 3: Time series of Belgian franc per German mark and the spread between 1-month
Euro market interest rates for the two currencies.
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Figure 4: Time series of Danish kroner per German mark and the spread between 1-month
Euro market interest rates for the two currencies.
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Figure 5: Time series of French franc per German mark and the spread between 1-month
Euro market interest rates for the two currencies.
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Figure 6: Time series of Irish pound per German mark and the spread between 1-month Euro
market interest rates for the two currencies.
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Figure 7: Time series of Italian lira per German mark and the spread between 1-month Euro
market interest rates for the two currencies.
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Figure 8: Time series of Dutch guilder per German mark and the spread between 1-month
Euro market interest rates for the two currencies.
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Figure 9: Time series of dierences between shadow exchange rates and current exchange rates
(f
t
- x
t
) for the various currencies versus German mark. Realignment dates are indicated by
vertical lines.
45
